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ARE PRIVATE ARBITRAL PANELS TRIBUNALS UNDER § 1782?:
ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW AND INTERPRETATIVE
APPROACHES
Maria Castro Sanchez*
Section 1782 authorizes the use of U.S. style discovery in aid of
foreign proceedings. This statute has only been substantively analyzed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Intel. Though this case provided guidance on
and clarified key issues regarding the application of 1782; it also gave
rise to questions regarding its application to foreign arbitralproceedings.
The recent flood of cases dealing with this issue have come to different
conclusions as to its scope and application, with some courts finding that
private foreign arbitrations are categorically outside of the scope of the
statute and others authorizing its use in both private and investor-state
foreign arbitrations. This Note focuses on this circuit split, looking to
both the Court's approach in Intel as well as the approaches and
arguments accepted by the lower courts on either side of the circuit split
in order to predict how this issue may be resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has very recently granted certiorari to resolve this issue.
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INTRODUCTION

As globalization and commercial transactions between parties of
different nationalities have increased, demand for adequate and fair
resolution of disputes between international parties has similarly
increased.' International arbitration has emerged as the method that is
both the more customizable and predictable method of resolving
international disputes than the vagaries of litigation-especially with
international parties where the need for a neutral forum and adequate
judicial enforcement is especially salient. 2
Consideration of the nature of the arbitral bodies presiding over
international commercial arbitration has become important in light of the
application of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) providing United States judicial
discovery assistance to foreign proceedings. This statute uniquely permits
district courts to order discovery "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or

1. See Julie Barker, InternationalMediation - A Better Alternative for the Resolution of
CommercialDisputes: Guidelinesfora U.S. Negotiator Involved in an InternationalCommercial
Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1996).
2. See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial
Arbitrationand Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV.
1337, 1341-42.
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international tribunal" upon a petition by "any interested person." 3 The
question of whether this expansive discovery statute is available for use
in private arbitral proceedings is at the heart of a recently developing
circuit split.4 The resolution to this question could potentially
permanently add or remove a powerful discovery tool from the belt of
those participating in private international arbitration.
First, this Note will explore the history of discovery under § 1782,
followed by a discussion of the circuit split arising prior to the United
States Supreme Court's seminal Intel decision. Subsequently, this Note
will discuss the cases following Intel, which have created some confusion
as to whether § 1782 encompasses private arbitrations. Next, this Note
will examine the parallel Servotronics cases, demonstrating the need for
U.S. Supreme Court review of this circuit debate. Finally, this Note will
scrutinize the principal analytical bases for the post-Intel decisions
evaluating the relative merits of different cases' approaches to the
question of private arbitration under § 1782.
I. WHAT IS § 1782? BACKGROUND BEFORE PRIVATE ARBITRATION
CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. Statutory History
Section 1782 comes from a history of the United States' lack of
avenue for providing aid to foreign courts. As early as 1855, it became
evident that the United States had no method of executing foreign letters
rogatory seeking aid in discovery. 5 Following some legislative fumbling,
Congress passed an Act in 1863, which limited district courts to executing
only those letters rogatory issued in suits in which a foreign government
had an interest. 6 This led to a period of judicial hostility to requests from

3. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782(a) (2021).

4. Compare Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 104-06 (2d Cir. 2020),

El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App'x 31, 33-34
(5th Cir. 2009), and Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020)
[hereinafter Servotronics IIJ, with Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 210 (4th Cir.
2020) [hereinafter Servotronics I], and Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., 939 F.3d

710, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2019).
5. See Harry. Leroy Jones, InternationalJudicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and A
Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 540 (1953) (describing the history of § 1782 in more
depth). Letters rogatory are defined in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations as a "formal request
from a court in which an action is pending, to a foreign court to perform some judicial act..." 22
C.F.R. § 92.54 (2020). Most commonly, this request involves discovery for use in pending

proceedings.
6. Jones, supra note 5, at 540. Prior to the 1963 enactment, the Attorney General in the

mid-1850's actually requested a more thorough approach which would fix the issues associated
with letters rogatory, however the due to revisions and indexing errors that act was "buried in

oblivion." Id.
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foreign courts, remedied only by the passage of section 1782.7
Section 1782 significantly expanded the scope of aid in discovery for
use in foreign proceedings. In its earliest form, it provided for "[t]he
deposition of any witness within the United States to be used in any
judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country with which
the United States is at peace ..."
The 1964 amendment to § 1782 was the result of research into the
extent to which judicial aid to foreign jurisdictions should be granted
9
given the increase in international commerce and the resultant disputes.
In 1958 Congress created the Commission on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure to investigate how judicial assistance of foreign
discovery could be improved.1
The 1964 revision to § 1782 further expanded the scope of the
provision, allowing district courts to order the production of documents
or testimony "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal," upon request by "a foreign or international tribunal or the
application of any interested person."" Notably, Congress deleted the
"any judicial proceeding" requirement and instead permitted this device
in foreign or internationaltribunals.12
The final and current version of the § 1782 statute, by its terms,
provided for broad discovery. It reads:
The. district court of the district in which a person resides or
isfound may order him to give his testimony or statement or
to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation. The
order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or
request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon
the application of any interested person and may direct that
the testimony or statement be given, or the document or
other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the
court. 13
Though district courts are given the discretion to grant or deny

7. Id at 541.
8. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139,

§ 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949). This reflects a minor edit to

the original 1948 text, striking out the word "residing" and replacing "civil action" with "judicial

proceeding." § 1782, ch. 117, 62 Stat. 949 (1948).
9. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004).
10. Id.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1996).
12. Though there was a 1996 amendment to § 1782, this amendment pertained to the use of
§ 1782 discovery in criminal investigations. Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 486,
486.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2020) (emphasis added).
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petitions, written into § 1782(a) are only a few explicit statutory
requirements for these petitioners. The first requirement is that the party
from whom discovery is requested reside or be found in the district of the
granting court's jurisdiction when the application is made.' 4 Next, the
discovery requested must be "for use" in a foreign proceeding.1 5 Finally,
the request must be made by a foreign/international tribunal or "any
interested person."' 6
B. Extra-StatutoryRequirements Pre-Intel
Several district courts applied other requirements before granting
discovery requests.1 7 These requirements stemmed from policy
considerations outside of the literal text of the statute. While the district
courts were given plenary discretion* over which applications could be
granted, the courts adding these extra-statutory requirements found that
certain implicit requirements controlled the judicial exercise of
discretion.1 8 These extra-statutory requirements provided the basis for a
circuit split in this international-based legislation and created different
results based on which district the information sought was located.19
The first extra-statutory requirement was of imminence. Although
pending had been removed from the text of the 1964 amendments, some
district courts nevertheless read a requirement of imminence into
§ 1782.20 The Second Circuit held that a § 1782 petition did not meet the
"for use" requirement where the evidentiary receipt portion of the

14. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782(a) (2020); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 527 (2d Cir. 2019)

(stating "the statutory scope of 'found' extends to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent

with due process."); Esses v. Hanania (In re Esses), 101 F.3d 873, 875 (2d Cir. 1996).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2020); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 524; In re Esses, 101
F.3d at 875. This question was partially resolved in Intel which did not read an imminence
requirement into these cases.

16. See 28 U.S.C.
F.3d at 875.

§ 1782(a) (2020); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 524; In re Esses, 101

17. See cases cited infra note 19.

18. Peter Metis, InternationalJudicial Assistance: Does 28 U.S.C. S 1782 Contain an
Implicit DiscoverabilityRequirement?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 332, 351-52 (1994).
19. Id. at 335-37.
20. See Ishihara Chem. Co. v. Shipley Co., 251 F.3d 120, 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring
that the proceeding be "imminent-[i.e.,] very likely to occur and very soon to occur," in order
for a § 1782 petition to be granted); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affs. of

Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988), (suggesting that district judges must
look to whether a proceeding is very likely to occur before granting a § 1782 petition); but see, In
re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Serv. of United Kingdom (In re Crown
Prosecution),870 F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring only that the proceeding be "within
reasonable contemplation").
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proceeding had already passed. 2 1 The Court required that the foreign
22
proceedings be "very likely to occur and very soon."
By contrast, other courts did not require a proceeding to be imminent.
The D.C. Circuit in In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Serv.
of United Kingdom 23 affirmed the grant of a § 1782 petition where the
discovery sought exceeded the scope of the one then-pending indictment
and was to be used for gathering evidence in a related investigation
against another individual. 24 The court found that applicants only needed
to show that the proceedings for which the discovery would be used were
in reasonable contemplation.2 5 This meant that applicants did not have to
be currently engaged in pending litigation.
The second extra-statutory requirement that split the circuits was the
foreign discoverability requirement. 26 This threshold discovery
requirement asked the district courts to look to the foreign jurisdiction's
discovery procedures and determine whether the information sought
27
would be discoverable under the laws of the foreign tribunal.
In John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp.,28 the Third Circuit held that
discretion to grant § 1782 applications from individual petitioners, and
not through letters rogatory, or other diplomatic channels, was limited to
only that information discoverable under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the discovery will be used. 29 Though the court denied a foreign
admissibility requirement, it still imposed the additional foreign
discovery requirement. 30 The court here seemed to be concerned
primarily with § 1782 being used as a tool to circumvent foreign
jurisdiction's discovery limitations.31
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit permitted the judge to use
discretion when analyzing cases where the discovery sought would not
32
In Foden v. Gianolibe discoverable in the foreign proceeding.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ishihara, 251 F.3d at 126.
Id. at 123, 125.
870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 689, 691, 693.
Id. at 694.

26. See cases cited infra note 32.

27. See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1992) (requiring
a threshold showing of discoverability reasoning that such a permissive interpretation would place

U.S. litigants abroad at a disadvantage and would contravene principles of comity and
reciprocity); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affs. of Trinidad and Tobago,
848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that district court "must decide whether the evidence
would be discoverable in the foreign country before granting assistance").
28. Deere, 754 F.2d at 132.
29. Id. at 136.
30. Id. at 138.
31. Id. at 136.
32. See Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Tech. Int'l Inc., 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding that a threshold discoverability requirement contravened the plain text and legislative
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Aldunate,33 the Court looked at § 1782's legislative history and
congressional intent and determined that there was no implicit
discoverability requirement. 3 4 While the Third Circuit in the John Deere
case found the question of circumvention of foreign procedures and
offense from foreign jurisdictions dispositive,35 the Second Circuit found
the plain text interpretation along with the legislative intent of the 1964
amendments of expanding aid to foreign tribunals and granting wide
discretion to district court judges inexorably led to the determination that
there was no threshold requirement. 36 The court suggested that these
policy considerations would better be addressed by the district judge's
discretion to deny petitions which would implicate these considerations. 3 7
C. The Supreme Court Addresses § 1782 in Intel
1. Intel Clarifies the Question of Extra-Statutory Requirements
The debate regarding these extra-statutory requirements was
addressed by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 38 the first, and only, time that the Court directly addressed
the application of § 1782.39 This seminal case resolved the circuit split
regarding a threshold discoverability requirement and the imminent
litigation requirement. The Court clarified certain ambiguities regarding
the interested party and provided factors that should guide the district
judge's discretion to grant or deny these petitions.
Intel arose from an antitrust dispute between Advanced Micro
Devices and Intel to be settled by the Directorate-General for
Competition (DG-Competition) of the Commission of European
Communities (European Commission). 4 0 AMD alleged that Intel
engaged in anti-competitive practices in violation of the European
competition law and requested that the DG-Competition seek discovery

intent behind

§ 1782); Foden v. Gianoli-Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59-62 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that

while an extra-statutory threshold finding of foreign discoverability was not required by § 1782,
district court judges may and should consider the concerns of comity and avoiding offense to
foreign jurisdictions through their discretion to deny petitions).

33. Foden, 3 F.3d at 54.
34. Id. at 59-60.
35. Deere, 754 F.2d at 136.

36. Foden, 3 F.2d at 59-60.
37. Id. at 62.
38. Intel Corp.

v.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).

39. Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2020) (stating that
"the Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Intel-the only Supreme Court case to address

§ 1782.").
40. Intel, 542 U.S. 241, 246, 250 (2004). The DG-Competition is the primary enforcer of
antitrust violations, acting through the European Commission to resolved disputes arising between
European Union members. Id. at 250.
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of documents. 4 1 AMD's § 1782 petition followed the DG-Competition's
denial of the request.4 2
Intel allowed the Court not only to resolve the circuit split, but also to
directly analyze the comity and international relations implications of
§ 1782's application to unwilling tribunals. 4 3 The Court resolved the
circuit split, holding that: (1) the proceeding for use in which the
discovery is sought need only be within reasonable contemplation44 and
45
(2) there is no foreign or domestic discoverability requirement. Though
resolving these circuit disputes in favor of a broader interpretation of the
statute, the Court reined in the impacts of these broad holdings by
emphasizing the importance of the district court's discretion to deny these

petitions. 4 6

The Court provided a set of considerations for district judges to use in
exercising their discretion. 47 These Intel factors resolved concerns
regarding the comity and parity of U.S. parties in foreign disputes raised
by the breadth of this expansive discovery mechanism. The Intel
discretionary factors create the framework guiding uniformity in the way
district court discretion is exercised. The first Intel factor suggests
discretion should be exercised in favor of petitions where the party from
whom discovery is sought is not a participant in the foreign
proceedings. 4 8 Next, district courts should look to whether the foreign
tribunal would be receptive to evidence gained through the procedure,
looking to the nature of the tribunal and proceedings. 4 9 The third Intel
factor takes comity and parity into account and asks courts to consider
whether the applicant is attempting to circumvent foreign restrictions on
discovery. 50 Finally, the last Intel factor departs from considerations of
international relations and simply asks the court to consider whether the
51
discovery request is unduly burdensome or intrusive.

41. Id. at 250.
42. Id. at 251.
43. In fact, the European commission took "the highly unusual step" of submitting an
amicus brief because they so stringently opposed the grant of discovery in this case. Brief of
Amicus Curiae the Commission of the European Communities Supporting Reversal, Intel Corp.

v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (No. 02-572), 2003 WL 23138389.
44. Intel, 542 U.S. at 259.
45. Id. at 260-63.
46. Id. at 264 (stating that "a district court is not required to grant a

§

1782(a) discovery

application simply because it has the authority to do so").
47. Id. at 247, 264.
48. Id. at 264.
49. Id.
50. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65.
51. Id. at 265.
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2. Intel Creates Ambiguity Regarding the Meaning of Tribunal
The Court's Intel factors provided the balance between unduly
restricting legislation which is both textually broad and is described as
broad by its primary drafter,5 2 and public policy considerations of parity
and comity. In resolving the circuit disputes regarding foreign
discoverability and the imminence requirement, the Court inadvertently
created a new split between the circuits regarding the scope of § 1782. In
holding that AMD's discovery request could be granted by the district
courts, the Court implicitly found that the European Commission, acting
through the DG-Competition, constitutes a foreign tribunal.53 Intel
invited federal courts to question whether international arbitral tribunals
fell within the ambit of § 1782's discovery provisions- disturbing the
previously unanimous agreement to the contrary. 54
D. Pre-Intel Treatment of PrivateArbitration Under § 1782
1. The Second Circuit Sets the Stage
In 1999, the Second Circuit unequivocally found that the scope of
§ 1782 did not extend to private arbitral institutions.5 5 In National
BroadcastingCo. v. Bear Stearns & Co., the court quashed subpoenas
issued pursuant to § 1782 for use in an international commercial
arbitration administered under the International Chamber of
Commerce. 56 The Second Circuit began by looking at the text of the
statute. Giving the terms "foreign or international tribunal" their ordinary

52. See Hans Smit, The Supreme CourtRules on the Proper InterpretationofSection 1782:

Its PotentialSignficance for InternationalArbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 295, 330 (2003)
(stating that, "[s]ection 1782 was drafted deliberately in broad terms to encourage the courts to be
as liberal and flexible as possible."). Author Smit refers to his being deemed the "dominant
drafter" of § 1782 in a D.C. Circuit opinion written by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 298 n.6.
53. Intel, 542 U.S. at 258 (stating "[w]e have no warrant to exclude the European
Commission, to the extent that it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker, from § 1782(a)'s ambit.").
54. See Anna Conley, A New World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent Federal
Courts' Decisions Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
S1782, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 45 (2006). Prior to the 2004 Intel decision, circuit courts
seemed uniform in their decision to deny discovery to arbitral tribunals, however there seemed to
be some debate between district courts before the Second Circuit ruled on National Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999). See generally Republic of Kaz.
v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding "we conclude that the term 'foreign
and international tribunals' in § 1782 was not intended to authorize resort to United States federal
courts to assist discovery in private international arbitrations."); In re Medway Power, 985 F.

Supp. 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that unofficial, private arbitrations do not fall under the
ambit of § 1782).
55. National Broadcasting Co.,

Inc.

v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (National Broadcasting),

165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 185-86.
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meaning, they found that the text was broad enough to encompass private
57
arbitral bodies but did not necessarily include them.
Finding the plain text reading of the statute ambiguous, the Second
Circuit then analyzed the legislative history and Congressional intent
surrounding the statute. 58 The court noted that the 1964 amendment,
replacing "judicial proceedings" with "foreign tribunal," was meant to
59
broaden the scope of the district court's ability to grant § 1782 petitions.
However, the court found it important that neither the House nor Senate
reports surrounding the 1964 amendments explicitly mentioned private
proceedings to resolve disputes. 60
The court ultimately found the lack of evidence in the legislative
history of this novel application, "which lay far beyond the realm of the
earlier statute," 6 1 was sufficient to justify finding that the legislation did
not apply. 62 The court suggested that Congress would need to explicitly
clarify this new scope of discovery. 63 It also noted that the predecessor to
§ 1782, which provided limited discovery aid in foreign proceedings,
used the term "international tribunal" to refer to intergovernmental
tribunals.64 The court suggested that the change in the 1964 amendment
to § 1782 was only meant to extend the scope to intergovernmental
tribunals not involving the U.S. 65
2. The Fifth Circuit Cements the Categorical Bar on § 1782 For Use in
Private Arbitrations
In the same year the Second Circuit decided National Broadcasting,
the Fifth Circuit decided a similar issue in Republic of Kazakhstan v.
Biedermann (Biedermann).66 The "foreign proceeding" in question at
Biedermann was an arbitration through the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 67 Unlike NationalBroadcasting,one
68
of the parties to this arbitration was a foreign State, however the Fifth
69
Circuit did not find this to be notable in the case. Rather, the court
57. Id. at 188.
58. Id. at 188-90.
59. Id. at 189-90.
60. National Broadcasting, 165 F. 3d at 189.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int'l (Biedermann), 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 881.
Id.

69. This is noteworthy given the Fifth Circuit's post-Intel treatment of other investor-state
arbitrations. For instance, in Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, the Fifth Circuit, in finding that

Chevron, which had sought aid under § 1782, was estopped from objecting to a
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followed the Second Circuit's analysis of the text of the statute and the
legislative history. 7 0
The court next looked at public policy to inform Congressional intent.
It examined discovery provisions for domestic arbitration, noting that
parties to wholly domestic arbitration could not seek compelled
discovery. 7 1 The court suggested that Congress could not have intended
for § 1782 to grant parties engaged in foreign arbitration greater access
to judicial aid in discovery than their domestic counterparts. 72
Finally, the court looked at the actual effects of applying § 1782's
broad discovery provision to arbitration. 73 Arbitration of commercial
disputes had the advantage of speedily and efficiently resolving
disputes. 74 Discovery disputes stemming from these broad requests for
information would bog down the arbitration process. 75 Further, the court
noted the importance of the contractual nature of arbitration and parties'
abilities to contract for discovery procedures. 7 6
II. POST-INTEL TREATMENT OF PRIVATE ARBITRATION UNDER

§ 1782

A. Post-Intel Circuit Split
The Second Circuit's analysis in National Broadcasting is one that
was later adopted by tribunals, even post-Intel. Circuits advocating this
view harmonized this approach with the Court's Intel analysis since this
holding was limited to determining that the DG-Competition, a more
administrative, public arbitral body, was an appropriate foreign tribunal
for the purposes of the statute, given its European Commission authority.
The Second Circuit determined that Intel did not change the National
Broadcasting analysis and upheld the view of § 1782 as being limited to
judicial or administrative quasi-judicial proceedings. 7 7 The majority of
the circuits that have ruled on this issue have adopted this view. 78
However, while these circuits continued with the Biedermann and
National Broadcasting view of § 1782, other circuits considered Intel as
having abrogated this previous precedent. Both the Fourth and Sixth
Biedermann, declined to explicitly rule on the question of whether such investor-state arbitrations
could be considered under § 1782 in light of Intel, though it "arguably" could be considered as

such. Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2013).
70. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881-82.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id.
Id.

76. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883.

77. See Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020).
78. See La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F.

Supp. 2d 481, 485 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Servotronics
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Circuit have addressed this issue head on and have permitted § 1782
applications to be granted for use in private arbitration. 9
1. The Second Circuit Maintains the Status Quo in Guo
80
In Hanwei Guo v. Detsche Bank Securities Inc, et al, the Second
Circuit maintained that Intel had not altered its interpretation of § 1782
as not applying to private arbitrations.81 This 2020 case cemented the
divide between districts regarding whether private arbitration constituted
a tribunal under § 1782. This case dealt with discovery sought for use in
an arbitration proceeding before the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). 82 This arbitral panel was part
of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade,
established by the Chinese government. 83
The court first examined Intel and determined that it did not conflict
with its decision in National Broadcasting.84 The court took a narrow
view of the Intel holding as limited to considering the Directorate
General-Competition a tribunal under the statute, not all private party
arbitrations.8 5 The reference to Hans Smit's article explicitly including
arbitral tribunals under the statute was merely dicta, in the view of the
second circuit. 86 Even if it were not, the court held that an arbitral
tribunal, per Professor Smit's statement, did not necessarily encompass
private arbitral tribunals, but might have referred only to those tribunals
created and empowered by a state. 87
The court then turned to the statute's legislative history, which under
Intel supported a broad and expansive view of the 1964 amendments to
§ 1782. Rather than abrogating National Broadcasting, the court
suggested that this was consistent with National Broadcasting, which
also affirmed Congressional intent to broaden the reach of discovery, but
not enough to encompass private international arbitration.89
Finding the National Broadcasting holding sound, the Court found it
was bound by the previous precedent and must analyze this case
according to National Broadcasting.9 0 It then turned to consider whether

79. See Servotronics 1, 954 F.3d at 210; Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.,

939 F.3d
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

710, 715 (6th Cir. 2019).
Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
Guo, 965 F.3d at 105.
Id.
Id. at 106; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258-59 (2004).
Guo, 965 F.3d at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
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the CIETAC proceedings constituted private international commercial
arbitration under National Broadcasting.9 1
National Broadcasting held that international tribunals wholly created
by private parties did not fall within § 1782's definition of a tribunal.92
Though CIETAC was originally created by the People's Republic of
China, the court held that the analysis did not end there.93 Rather, the
court had to look to "whether the body in question possesses the
functional attributes most commonly
associated with private
arbitration."9 4 This inquiry would reflect the "functional approach
adopted by the Intel court," 9 5 and look to factors like the degree of state
affiliation and independence the arbitral body had from the State that
created it and the degree of private party, contractual control over the
proceedings. 9 6
The court's state affiliation analysis looked at the extent of state
direction that CIETAC received. 97 CIETAC did not receive guidance
from the State in choosing arbitrators or in its proceedings, which were
confidential, limiting opportunities for state intervention. 98 The court
found that CIETAC's independence and autonomy suggested a low
degree of state affiliation.
The court next turned to the State's ability to review the result of the
arbitration.100 The court determined that the State's limited review of
arbitral awards, essentially limited to the review undertaken by the United
States under the New York Convention as to whether to set aside a foreign
arbitral award, was not sufficient to render CIETAC a tribunal under
§ 1782.101 Permitting arbitrationwith this base level of state involvement
would require that nearly all arbitration taking place abroad would fall
under the scope of § 1782, as many states have adopted the New York
Convention and this same review procedure.102
Finally, the court looked to CIETAC's jurisdiction and whether it
exceeded the bounds of the private parties' contractual agreement. 103 The
court determined that CIETAC's authority was limited to what was

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.

Id. at 107.
Id.
Guo, 965 F.3d at 107.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Guo, 965 F.3d at 107
Id. at 107-08.
Id.
Id. at 108.
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conferred on them by the parties' agreement.104 Unlike state-affiliated
tribunals, CIETAC did not have any governmental backing granting it
jurisdiction.1 05
In affirming the denial of § 1782 aid for use in the CIETAC
proceeding, the court held that CIETAC did not constitute a foreign
tribunal. 0 6 In so doing, the court expanded National Broadcasting's
analysis to include more than just the origin of the tribunal. Rather, the
court rooted its analysis on the same functional approach taken by the
Intel court and looked to the quasi-judicial and state-sponsored features
of the arbitral tribunal. If the arbitral tribunal is essentially an extension
of the state's power, then it falls under the ambit of § 1782, like the DGCompetition in Intel.
While the Guo court took a restrictive view of Intel and of the
definition of foreign tribunal, it notably did not address this question
regarding tribunals established pursuant to bilateral investment treaty.
The court suggested that these BIT-based arbitral bodies and disputes
may be different from other arbitral proceedings and may constitute
tribunals under § 1782.107
2. The Sixth Circuit Expands the Scope of § 1782
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit determined that Intel had
changed the analysis regarding whether arbitral tribunals fell within the
ambit of § 1782. The court addressed this same issue of whether a private
arbitration fell within the ambit of § 1782 in Abdul Latif Jameel
TransportationCo. v. FedEx Corp.. 108
In AIl Transportation,the Sixth Circuit held that a § 1782 discovery
application could be granted for use in a private commercial arbitration
under the rules of the Dubai International Financial Centre-London Court
of International Arbitration (DIFC-LCIA). 109 The DIFC-LCIA is a "joint
venture" 1 0 of the DIFC Arbitration Institute and the LCIA."' The DIFC
is a statutorily established arbitral tribunal.' 1 2 Its awards are directly
reviewable by the DIFC Court and also subject to limited review by the
3
United Arab Emirates for failure to conform with public policy." Like

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Guo, 965 F.3d at 108.
107. Id. at 108, n.7.
108. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. [hereinafter ALJ Transp.], 939 F.3d
710, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2019).
109. Id. at 730-31.
110. Id. at 714-15.
111. Id. at 714-15.
112. Id. at 715.
113. ALJ Transp., 939 F.3d at 715.
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the CIETAC panel in Guo, the DIFC-LCIA panel consisted of members
appointed by this institute.1 1 4
The court first approached the question with a textual analysis of
§ 1782, particularly on the meaning of the word tribunal. First, the court
looked at the dictionary definition of tribunal as used in 1964, the year
the statute adopted the "foreign tribunal" language. 15 Several legal and
some non-legal dictionaries defined "tribunal" broadly enough to
encapsulate private arbitrations."1 6 However, these mixed results did not
resolve the question.
The court next turned to the use of the term "tribunal" in legal writing
in general. The court found support for the "historical and continuing
usage of the word to describe private arbitrations."11 7 The court looked to
state court as well as federal court usage of the term tribunal to describe
private agreements to arbitrate."1 8
Finally, the court looked to the use of "tribunal" in other parts of the
statute. The court specifically addressed the statute's reference to taking
discovery pursuant to the "practice and procedure of the foreign country
or the international tribunal."11 9 It found that this particular sentence did
not support the position that tribunals were limited to governmental
entities but was instead a provision permitting the district court to borrow
from the tribunal's evidentiary procedures.1 2 0
Concluding that a textual analysis of the provision does not preclude
the application to private arbitration, the court next turned to Intel. The
court acknowledged that Intel did not speak directly to the issue of § 1782
as applied to private arbitrations.121 However, the court determined that
the Intel court's reasoning in allowing the Directorate-General for
Competition to be considered a tribunal under the legislation suggested
that tribunal applies to non-judicial proceedings which are "quasijudicial."1 2 2 Unlike the court in Guo, the court here accorded eat weight
to the Supreme Court's reference to Hans Smit's article.' 2 The court
found support in its holding that § 1782 applied to private arbitration from
Intel. 124

The court also reviewed the circuit decisions holding that private
arbitral panels did not fall under § 1782, looking at the precedent set by
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721-22.

119. AL Transp., 939 F.3d at 722.

120. Id. at 722-23.
121. Id. at 723.

122. Id. at 724.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 723.
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National Broadcasting and Biedermann. It found that the National
Broadcasting's and Biedermann's reliance on legislative history was
unnecessary given the textual support for the broader use of tribunal from
both the dictionary definition as well as courts' long-term use of the term
in this way.125 Even if this analysis were necessary, the court found the
NationalBroadcastingand Biedermann courts' analysis of the legislative
history lacking. 12 6 The court found the statements used by these courts
actually supported a broader, rather than narrower, reading of § 1782.127
Lastly, the court looked at the policy implications of providing for this
broad discovery tool in private arbitrations. First, it turned to the
comparison of this foreign discovery procedure to what is offered for
12 8 The court found
domestic arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.
unpersuasive concerns regarding the fairness of permitting this broad
discovery for private international arbitration proceedings but not to
corresponding domestic proceedings.1 2 9 Citing Intel's rejection of the
foreign discoverability requirement as analogous, the court determined
that proportionality arguments regarding the breadth of this discovery
tool did not control.1 3 0 As with the foreign discoverability concern, the
court found that applying a categorical bar on discovery for use in private
arbitration simply because such discover7 would not be available in
domestic proceedings was inappropriate. 3
The court next considered the impacts of permitting this discovery on
the efficiency of arbitral proceedings. The court found this concern could
be remedied by the district court's discretion to deny discovery requests
that it deems too burdensome.1 3 2 In exercising their discretion, district
court judges could consider the appropriateness of the discovery sought
for the more expedited arbitration context. 133
Finally, the court considered the appropriateness of expanding § 1782
to include private arbitration in light of the "twin aims" of § 1782. These
aims are of "providing efficient assistance to participants in international
litigation, and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide
similar assistance."'3 4 Though providing discovery assistance for use in

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

AL! Transp., 939 F.3d at 726-27.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id at 728-29.
Id at 729.
ALJ Transp., 939 F.3d at 129.
Id at 730.
Id
Id See also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 252. However,

it is important to note that the Supreme Court never adopted this as its official view of

Congressional intent in adopting

§ 1782, rather, the Court in Intel simply cites this provision from
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arbitration might not serve these purposes as directly as with international
tribunals, it did not contravene those goals.1 35
Based on all of these factors and arguments, the Sixth Circuit broke
from the Second and Fifth Circuit's precedent and held that private
arbitral tribunals fell within the § 1782 definition of tribunals.' 36
These decisions mark a widening circuit split regarding this issue. Just
as with the foreign discoverability requirement, these different
interpretations between the circuits can cause § 1782 petitioners to
"receive different treatment based on the geographic location of the
evidence in question."1 37
3. Private Commercial Arbitration vs Investor-State Arbitration
While not within the primary purpose of this Note, it is worth noting
the treatment of investor-state arbitration (ISAs) post-Intel. In the postIntel era, U.S. courts had routinely found ISAs to fall within the ambit of
the statute, before ever addressing the applicability to private commercial
arbitrations.1

38

Unlike private commercial arbitration, ISAs arise out of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) or multilateral investment treaties. 139 Under
these agreements, the host state essentially waives its sovereign immunity
and grants investors acting under the treaty the ability to initiate arbitral
proceedings to resolve disputes between them.1 40 This creates a standing
offer from the State to arbitrate certain disputes.141 Though the State is

the Ninth Circuit's holding in the case at the prior appeal stage. Intel, 542 U.S. at 252; see also

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002).
135. ALJ Transp., 939 F.3d at 730.
136. Id. at 730-31.
137. Metis, supra note 18, at 335-36.
138. See Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial ofJustice, 53. VA. J. INT'L L.

127, 128 (2012).
139. S.I.

Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. S 1782: Distinguishing International

Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX

LITIG.

295, 332 (2013); See Melissa Stear Gorsline & Maria Pradilla Picas, US. Discovery in Aid of
Investor-State Arbitrations: A Blessing or A Curse?, 30 MD. J. INT'L L. 14, 21 (2015).
140. See Strong, supra note 139 (discussing the grant of jurisdiction undertaken by a State
party to a BIT or similar instrument and distinguishing this grant from that given to "first
generation international tribunals"). Strong notes that like "first generation tribunals" such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), BITs and
other investment treaties involve a grant of jurisdiction to an external tribunal over certain types
of claims. Id. at 327. Unlike "first generation tribunals" however, the jurisdiction acts as an "offer
to arbitrate" and is therefore contingent on the investor's choice. Id. at 332-33. In this way,
investor state arbitration is the middle ground between "first generation tribunals," which waive
a State's ability to litigate certain disputes, and private commercial arbitrations, which are wholly
reliant on contract and individual party choices. Id.
141. Id. at 332 (citing Julian D.M. Lew et al., Comparative International Commercial

Arbitration

¶¶ 27-3 to 27-83 (2003)).
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generally obligated to submit to arbitration upon request per the BIT, the
42
By contrast, private
arbitration is based on the investor's consent.1
arbitration is entirely a creature of contract and depends on both parties'
agreement to arbitrate. 143
Oxus Gold,'44 a decision rendered just two years after Intel, disturbed
the placid waters of the definition of a tribunal under § 1782,
distinguished between the private arbitral proceedings in National
Broadcastingand the investor-state proceedings conducted under United
45
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules.1
The court held that this proceeding constituted a foreign tribunal because
it was "conducted by the United Nations Commission on International
Law," and was authorized by the BIT between the UK and the
Kyrgyzstan Republic. 146
Though the court correctly identified the grant of jurisdiction/waiver
of sovereign immunity authorized by states pursuant to a BIT, its analysis
of the role of UNCITRAL in resolving the dispute is lacking. Contrary to
the court's suggestion, UNCITRAL does not conduct or supervise
proceedings undertaken under the rules.1 47 Further, these rules had been
used to provide the framework for a variety of private arbitral
proceedings and were meant to aid parties involved in ad hoc
arbitration. 14 8
The Oxus court's overestimation of the judicial and administrative
nature of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is represented in cases
following Oxus distinguishing between private arbitration and ISA and
permitting judicial aid for the latter.1 49 This confusion regarding the role
of arbitral rules under UNCITRAL and the exact nature of investment
arbitration remained unaddressed in a later series of cases granting § 1782

142. Id. at 325.
143. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (stating that the
"fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract").

144. In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. MISC.06-82, 2006 WL 2927615
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006).
145. Id. at *6.
146. Id.
147. See Strong, supra note 139, at 308.
148. Id See generally G.A. Res. 65/22, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Jan. 10, 2011),
(https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/arb-rules-revised-

2010-e.pdf). Though the UNCITRAL rules do not provide exclusively for the resolution of
investor-state disputes, concerns regarding the private and confidential nature of arbitral

proceedings involving investor-state arbitrations pursuant to BITs with huge public policy impacts
lead to the adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration. See generally, G.A. Res. 68/109, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Jan. 10, 2011),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/uncitral-arbitration

-rules-2013-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM4H-TGHS].
149. See Strong, supra note 139, at 308-09.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss2/4

18

Sanchez: Are Private Arbitral Panels Tribunals Under § 1782?: Analysis of

20201

ARE PRIVATE ARBITRAL PANELS TRIBUNALS UNDER § 1782?

289

applications for use in an investment arbitration surrounding a complex
dispute between Chevron and Ecuador. 150
The distinction between investor-state arbitration and private
commercial arbitration has been preserved by at least some courts in the
post-Intel circuit split. In Guo, the court, in a footnote, addressed the
requesting party's argument that the private arbitration there was similar
enough to an ISA to fall within the ambit of the statute. 151 The court found
it unpersuasive, reaffirming its view that while ISAs fell within the ambit
of the statute, private commercial arbitrations were distinct and did not
constitute tribunals under the statute.15 2
The distinction between investor-state arbitration pursuant to
investment treaties and private commercial arbitration for § 1782
purposes has not been parsed out by the courts. Guo's footnote suggests
that courts will continue to view these two types of arbitration as distinct
without endeavoring an in-depth analysis of the differences between
them.' 53

4. Servotronics: The Matched Set
The effects of the lack of uniformity for § 1782 petitioners seeking
discovery in divergent circuits are apparent in two recent cases reaching
the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. These circuits adopted different
interpretations of the "tribunal" requirement under the statute. These
different interpretations led to the same party being barred from seeking
discovery for use in its arbitration in one district court while having the
other district court be able to exercise its discretion to grant the
application. 154
In these two cases, § 1782 applicant Servotronics, Inc., a valve
manufacturer, sought discovery from two U.S. companies for use in
private arbitration in the United Kingdom pursuant to an agreement under

150. Id. at 311-12 (noting that as a result of the interconnected nature of cases arising out of
this dispute, many decisions were based wholly on the precedent from earlier determinations of
the issue, leaving a "very sparsely reasoned precedent").

151. Guo, 965 F.3d at 108, n.7.
152. Jd. The court found it key in the distinction between the two that the adjudicatory
authority to arbitrate in the case of private arbitration is derived solely from the parties, while
ISAs stem from "the intervention or license of any government to adjudicate" these cases. Id. The
court also noted that ISAs typically involved a private party and a state, making it distinct from
disputes between two wholly private parties. Id.
153. See generally Strong, supra note 139, for an in-depth analysis of the differences
between investor state and private commercial arbitration. These differences and the merits of
permitting § 1782 requests in either context are approached in the post-Intel context. The
inconsistencies stemming from this distinction are addressed in the analysis section of this paper.

154. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC (Servotronics II), 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir.
2020); Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. (Servotronics 1), 954 F.3d 209, 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2020).
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the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb)."' This dispute arose when
a Boeing engine, manufactured and installed by Rolls-Royce, caught fire
and damaged a Boeing aircraft. 156 Following a settlement between the
two, Rolls-Royce sought indemnification from Servotronics for damages,
claiming that the engine fire was due to a malfunction with the engine
valves that Servotronics had supplied.15 7 Rolls-Royce submitted the
dispute to arbitration in the UK under the CIArb rules pursuant to their
long-term agreement.1 58
Servotronics sought discovery from Boeing in two separate § 1782
applications. It sought documents from Boeing's headquarters in the
Northern District of Illinois. 159 It also sought depositions from employees
in the Charleston facility located in the District of South Carolina 60. The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially granted the
application.161 By contrast, the district court in South Carolina denied
Servotronics' § 1782 application. 162 These applications were appealed up
3
to the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.' 6
a. The Fourth Circuit Servotronics Opinion
In Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. (Servotronics 1),' the Fourth
Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit in holding that a private arbitration could
constitute a tribunal under § 1782. The court first addressed the
arguments each party raised concerning the Biedermann and National
Broadcasting precedent.165 It then looked to the Congressional intent
surrounding the 1964 amendment to § 1782 and the use of the word
"tribunal." 166 Finally, the court looked at the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and any conflicts that would arise from permitting § 1782 to be
used in foreign arbitrations.1 67
The district court relied on Biedermann and NationalBroadcastingin
denying the § 1782 application, finding it undisturbed by Intel.16 In
addressing whether it should rely on these two precedential cases, the
court first noted that the Sixth Circuit in ALJ Transportationwas the first
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Servotronics I, 975 F.3d at 691; Servotronics 1, 954 F.3d at 210-11.
Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 690-91; Servotronics1, 954 F.3d at 210.
Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 690-91; Servotronics1, 954 F.3d at 210.
Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 691; Servotronics I, 954 F.3d at 210-11.
Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 691.
Servotronics 1, 954 F.3d at 211.
Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 691.
Servotronics 1, 954 F.3d at 210-il.
See Servotronics I, 954 F. 3d at 210; Servotronics I, 975 F.3d. at 691.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id at 209.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 212-14.
Id at 212.
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circuit court to address the question of § 1782 for use in foreign
arbitration since Intel.16 9 The court noted that the ALJ Transportation
case cast doubt on the Biedermann and NationalBroadcastingprecedent
and created a split of authority. 7 0 Given that no Fourth Circuit case spoke
to this exact issue, the court found it did not have to defer to Biedermann
or NationalBroadcasting.'7

'

The court found the record surrounding § 1782 supported an
expansive reading of the statute Congress's intent was to increase the
avenues for assistance in resolving disputes before all foreign tribunals.1 72
This change was meant to reflect assistance in connection with more than
just foreign courts, and also include quasi-judicial proceedings abroad.17 3
Finally, the court turned to the policy arguments. The court began by
highlighting Con ress's endorsement and regulation of arbitration
through the FAA. 7 4 The FAA both provided the procedures governing
arbitrations, including permitting court supervision and enforcement of
arbitral awards.7 5 This made arbitration a product of government
conferred authority under U.S. law. 17 6 The same level of regulation
present in the FAA was evidenced in the UK Arbitration Act which
governed the arbitral tribunal governing the dispute.1 7 7 The UK arbitral
panel under which the dispute would be resolved had sufficient
government authority that it would meet even the restrictive pre-Intel
view of what functionally could be considered a "tribunal."1 78
The court also addressed the practical effects of permitting § 1782
discovery for use in private arbitrations. Although use of the full extent
of U.S. discovery procedures would burden the more efficient resolution
contracted for in arbitration clauses, this all or nothing conception of
§ 1782 misinterprets its scope and function.1 7 9 Section 1782 was not
meant to authorize a full discovery for a party to an arbitration.1 80 Rather,
the statute authorizes the district court to gather information for use in a
foreign tribunal in the stead of that tribunal. 8

169. Servotronics I, 954 F.3d at 212.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 213.

174. Id.
175. Servotronics I, 954 F.3d at 213.
176. Id.

177. Id. at 214.
178. Id

179. Id.
180. Id. The court noted that the text of the provision does not even mention the word
discovery. Id. It just alludes to the use of U.S. evidentiary rules in gathering the information in
the absence of the district court's statement to the contrary. Id

181. Id at 214-15.
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Next, the court turned to the possible conflict with the FAA by
authorizing discovery in foreign arbitration beyond what is permitted in
domestic arbitration. Specifically at issue, was the expansion of foreign
discovery aid in allowing any interested person to petition for § 1782 aid,
the extension of subpoena power beyond the district of the seat of
18 2
The
arbitration, and authorizing non-parties to appear in depositions.
court, however, keyed these "expansions" as a distinct procedure stating
that § 1782 permits district courts, where information is sought, to act
"effectively as a surrogate" for the foreign tribunal. 183 Under § 1782, the
court acts to enforce some measure of information gathering, just as UK
courts do under the UK Arbitration Act, allowing arbitrators access to
subpoenaed testimony and documents. 184 The provision may expand the
scope of the foreign arbitration's authority beyond what comparable U.S.
arbitrations or even the foreign panel would have under its own laws;
however, this expansion reflects Congressional policymaking to allow
broader discovery in these cases. 185
Finally, just as the ALJ Transportationcourt suggested, the court here
suggested that analogizing and comparing the permitted discovery under
the FAA to that permitted under § 1782 was not within the scope of
review for this question.1 86 In rejecting the discoverability requirement,
the Intel court disclaimed the need for analogous domestic discovery in
applying § 1782.187
b. The Seventh Circuit Servotronics Opinion
In a parallel case, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the same facts to come
to a different conclusion. In Servotronicsv. Rolls-Royce (ServotronicsII),
the court held that the arbitral panel acting under CIArb rules did not
constitute a foreign "tribunal" under § 1782. This result widened the
existing circuit divide, as the Seventh Circuit sided with the Sixth, Fifth,
and Second Circuits regarding this question of first impression in this
circuit.18 8
Like the Fourth Circuit, the court in Servotronics II looked at the
precedent set by other circuits and whether Intel had changed the
applicability of National Broadcastingand Biedermann. Notably, at the
182. Id. at 215.
183. Servotronics I, 954 F.3d at 215.

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id. (stating "§ 1782 'is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad [that] does not

direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine whether analogous

proceedings exist [in the United States]." Id. (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241, 263 (2004)).
188. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC (Servotronics II), 975 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.
2020).
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time of this case, the Second Circuit had already affirmed its National
Broadcasting interpretation of § 1782.189 Considering the circuit court
split regarding Intel's effects on this question, the court found that Intel
itself did not "tip the scales in favor of either side of the circuit split."1 90
Finding the definition of "tribunal" inconclusive, the court turned to
the statutory context.1 9 1 The court began by looking at the "statutory
charge" the Commission International Rules of Judicial Procedure
followed in drafting the rule. 19 2 This charge did not include investigation
into improving judicial assistance for private foreign arbitration, rather it
spoke more broadly to the "existing practices of judicial assistance and
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries ... "193 The
Commission's work yielded three other statutes dealing with letters
rogatory and foreign litigation service of process.1 94 "Service-of-process
assistance and letters rogatory-governed by §§ 1696 and 1781-are
matters of comity between governments, which suggests that the phrase
'foreign or international tribunal' as used in this statutory scheme means
state-sponsored tribunals and does not include private arbitration
panels."1 95
Like the Sixth Circuit in the ALJ Transportationcase, the court in
Servotronics II looked at the use of the term "tribunal" in other parts of
§ 1782.196 Unlike the court in ALJ Transportation, the Seventh Circuit
deemed that the provision allowing the discovery to take place as
proscribed by the court or be "in whole or part the practice andprocedure
of the foreign country or the internationaltribunal"19 7 suggests a more

limited reading of the term "tribunal." 198 Since private foreign
arbitrations do not have the same practice and procedures that foreign
administrative and quasi-governmental tribunals do, they are not included
within the meaning of this phrase.1 99
Like the Fourth Circuit in the sister Servotronics case, this court
addressed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Unlike the Fourth Circuit,
the court found that allowing § 1782 to apply to foreign arbitrations
would cause a "serious conflict" with the FAA's rules governing

189. Id. at 693
190. Id.

191. Id. at 694.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906

§ 2, 72 Stat. 1743).

194. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 694.

195. Id. at 695.
196. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019);
Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 695.

197. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 695 (emphasis in original) (citing 28 U.S.C.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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domestic discovery. 2 00 One of the greatest sources of conflict stems from
who may seek the discovery aid. While § 1782 permits any interested
parties to seek broad discovery aid, the FAA only permits the arbitration
panel itself to summon witnesses to the panel. 2 0 1 The court also flagged
the FAA's applicability to certain foreign arbitral proceedings as another
possible source of conflict.2 02

III.

RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: NEED FOR
COURT REVIEW

U.S.

SUPREME

The Servotronics cases demonstrate the practical impacts of the lack
of judicial clarity on the question of what constitutes a tribunal. Though
presented with the exact same factual scenario on a question of first
impression, the Seventh and Fourth Circuits came to very different
conclusions regarding the applicability of § 1782 to private arbitrations
in the post-Intel context. This disparate application of the law between
circuits has the potential to create forum shopping and inequitable results
for parties proceeding on the same facts. This unequal result has been
aptly demonstrated by the Servotronics matched set, leaving no doubts as
to the existence of a circuit split. The existence of this split is evident in
the Supreme Court's decision to grant review on this issue in this context.
On March 22, 2021, the Court granted certiorari on the Seventh Circuit's
Servotronics case.203
A. PlainMeaning Textual Analysis
Throughout the post-Intel cases, courts have routinely begun by
analyzing the plain meaning of the term "foreign or international
tribunal" in § 1782(a). 204 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Servotonics I
and the Sixth's opinion in ALJ Transportationprovide thorough and
detailed textual analyses of the term.
Both of these opinions began by looking to dictionary definitions of
tribunal. 2 05 Both determined that this analysis alone did not conclusively
resolve the question, though even the Seventh Circuit conceded that the
definition was broad enough to encompass private arbitration.206 The
Sixth Circuit also looked to the use of the term "tribunal" in other legal

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 695-96.
203. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, No. 20-794, 2021 WL 1072280 (U.S. Mar. 22,
2021).
204. 28 U.S.C. 1782(a).
205. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 693; Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALI
Transp.), 939 F.3d 710, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2019).
206. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 694; A LJ Transp., 939 F.3d at 720.
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writing and found added support for the determination that the term
encompasses private arbitral bodies. 2 0 7
Unlike other courts to address the issue, both the Seventh and Sixth
Circuit opinions looked to the statutory context. 208 Looking to the same
three uses of the term "tribunal" in the statute, the courts came to different
conclusions. The Servotronics I court found the context supported a
limited reading of tribunal to only include judicial and administrative
tribunals having a practice or procedure of discovery, and not private.2 09
Addressing the same part of the statute, the AI Transportationcourt
determined that this use was consistent with authorizing district courts to
borrow the practice or procedure of other tribunals, if they chose. 2 10
Though both opinions provide thorough examinations of the plain text
meaning of "tribunal" in the statute, the Sixth Circuit's analysis comes to
the correct conclusion. The Seventh Circuit's analysis relied on §§ 1696
and 1781, which deal with letters rogatory and service of process
requests. 2 Because arbitral tribunals have no authority to issue service
of process requests or letters rogatory, the court found tribunals in this
context could not mean private arbitral tribunals. 2 12
This reading, however, fails to account for two key points. First,
@ 1781 refers to letters rogatory or "request[s] made," 213 implying that the
drafters envisioned these provisions to apply even to arbitral bodies
which can only make requests for evidence. 2 14 Second, the Supreme
Court in Intel rejected the argument that interested parties had to be
limited to litigants to be consistent with § 1696, since private parties
could not serve process unless they filed suit.2 15 Rather, the Supreme
Court determined that the provision permits "service of 'any document'
issued in connection with a foreign proceeding." 2 16
B. Legislative Intent
Upon a finding of ambiguity under the textual analysis, nearly every
other court to address this post-Intel issue turned to legislative history.
Intel notably provided a thorough legislative history for the 1964
207. ALJ Transp., 939 F. 3d at 720-22.
208. Servotronics 1, 975 F.3d at 694-95; ALJ Transp., 939 F.3d at 722-23. It is worthy of
noting that an analysis of the statutory context of the term "tribunal" is absent in the seminal
National Broadcastingand Biedermann decisions which, upon finding the dictionary use of the
term did not unambiguously solve the question, then turned to legislative history.
209. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 695.

210. ALJ Transp., 939 F.3d at 722-23.
211. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 695.
212. Id.
213. Id at 691. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(1) (2021).
214. Servotronics II, 975 F.3d at 695.
215. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255-57, n.10 (2004).

216. Id.
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amendments. The analysis provided by the Supreme Court in Intel
regarding the legislative history seems to suggest a broad reading of the
statute as a whole.
However, while the Supreme Court's reading of the history suggests
this expansive approach, the Court never addressed the question of
whether § 1782 can be for use in private arbitration. In fact, the Court's
reference to arbitration is contained, not in the legislative history, but
2 17
instead from a law review article by a drafter of the revised statute.
Post-Intel cases holding that private arbitral panels did not constitute
tribunals, emphasized that this expansive language was not part of the
original senate report and could not speak to legislative history as a
whole. This critique seems in line with any analysis of legislative history,
including Congressional reports which do not necessarily indicate the
2 18
intent of every congress member to vote on the legislation.
While the direct reference to an "arbitral tribunal" 2 19 was dictum, the
Court's report of the legislative history and statutory construction support
a broad view of the statute. Though the only direct reference to arbitration
in the case was in the footnote, it's equally true that the only evidence to
the contrary is the lack of explicit reference to arbitration in the legislative
history. The lack of evidence regarding Congressional intent as to the
application of § 1782 to arbitral proceedings and the support of an overall
broad reading of the text in light of the 1964 amendments suggest that the
legislative history is either neutral or supportive of the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit's approach to this question.2 2 0
C. The Intel FunctionalApproach
While Intel marks a turning point in the definition of "tribunal" under
§ 1782, leading two circuit courts to read it as encompassing private
arbitration, it's notable that Intel does not hold this.221 In fact, Intel did
not even deal with arbitration at all. Rather, the Supreme Court in Intel
held that the DG-Competition constituted a foreign tribunal because it
217. See generally Smit, supra note 52.

218. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) ("Of course that does
not necessarily say anything about what Congress as a whole thought. Assuming that all the
members of the three Committees in question (as opposed to just the relevant Sub committees)
actually adverted to the interpretive point at issue here-which is probably an unrealistic
assumption-and assuming further that they were in unanimous agreement on the point, they would
still represent less than two-fifths of the Senate, and less than one-tenth of the House.").

219. Id. at 258.
220. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 212-15 (4th Cir. 2020); Abdul Latif
Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., 939 F.3d 710, 724 (6th Cir. 2019).
221. Ex rel Winning (HK) Int'l Shipping Co., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *7
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010) (stating that, "as conceded by almost all of the post-Intel rulings, the
Supreme Court in Intel never addressed the issue of whether a private arbitration forum qualified
as a tribunal under section 1782").
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acted as a "first instance decision-maker" that rendered "dispositive
rulings" which were subject to judicial review. 2 2 2 This analysis gave rise
to a functional assessment of arbitral tribunals. Some courts have
permitted § 1782 petitions for use in foreign arbitrations because the
arbitral tribunals have been quasi-judicial and have acted as first instance
decision-makers rendering final judgments subject to judicial review.
This functional approach is evidenced by the Second Circuit's opinion
in Guo. There, the court found that the limited review permitted by
CIETAC and lack of State conferred jurisdictional grant did not render it
a first instance decision-maker considered a tribunal for § 1782 for Intel
purposes. 223 The court's analysis in this case highlights the issue with
treating ISAs and private arbitrations differently.
One question highlighted by this approach is whether the different
treatment of investor-state arbitration and private arbitration is warranted.
ISAs and private arbitrations bear many similarities. The functional
analysis under Intel has highlighted two questions: (1) degree of state
affiliation and (2) judicial reviewability and enforcement. These are two
areas where the differences between private arbitration and ISAs pursuant
to investment treaties are more illusory than functional.
As to the question of degree of state affiliation, ISAs involve one State
party and a national of another state. 2 2 4 This does constitute some degree
of state affiliation, as the State is essentially permitting foreign investors
to act as private attorney generals with the ability to initiate arbitral
proceedings to redress government breaches of treaty protections. 225 This
grant of jurisdiction does not generally broaden the power of arbitral
tribunals to resolve the disputes. 2 2 6 Rather, it permits investors to choose
to pursue arbitration against the State. BITs often contain provisions
permitting the investor to seek arbitration administered through some
reputable private arbitral institution, or through ad hoc arbitration
pursuant to rules like the UNCITRAL Rules. 2 2 7 These same institutions
or rules may be and are frequently employed to resolve private
commercial disputes. 2 2 8 This demonstrates that the initial grant of state

222. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246-47, 255 (2004).
223. Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2020).
224. Martin J. Valasek & Rende Thdriault, Investor-State Arbitration in Canada, ACC
Docket, October 2011, at S5, S5; See Strong, supra note 139, at 332; Susan D. Franck, Foreign
Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. McGEORGE
GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 337, 343-44 (2007).
225. Franck, supra note 224, at 344.
226. See Strong, supra note 139, at 354 (noting that the inclusion of certain arbitration rules
into investment treaties suggests and indirectly incorporates principles limiting judicial
intervention into these arbitrations).

227. Id.
228. Id. at 361.
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authority under investment treaties does not constitute state affiliation of
9
the actual arbitral tribunal before which the case proceeds. 2 2
The question of judicial review has been key in certain courts'
functional Intel analysis. 2 3 0 The question of judicial enforcement of
awards as well as the bases for review is one that is consistent regardless
of whether the arbitral award is for an ISA or private arbitration. Under
either type of arbitration proceeding, the review of arbitral awards and
the enforcement thereof is guided by treaties or legislation. As a party to
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the New York Convention), the U.S., along with 167 other
contracting states, 2 3 1 is bound to recognize foreign arbitral awards,
subject to limited judicial review. 2 3 2 This limited review is the same
regardless of whether the award results from an investor-state arbitration
or a private arbitration, meaning there is no functional difference in the
review-ability under these two arbitral regimes.
Under the functional review mechanisms employed by most courts,
ISAs and private arbitrations are difficult to distinguish. An approach
allowing § 1782 petitions for use in arbitrations pursuant to an investment
treaty but not for similar private arbitral tribunals is inconsistent with this
functional approach. Under the functional approach, courts with settled
law including ISAs as tribunals under § 1782 should logically extend this
definition to private arbitral tribunals.
D. The Policy Arguments: ConflictingLaws and Harm to Arbitration
The circuit court decisions addressing the interpretation of § 1782 to
foreign international arbitration address, not only the textual reading and
congressional intent of the statute, but also touch on the policy
implications. These concerns are separated into two categories: (1)
asymmetric effects on information gathering available for foreign
229. Note, investment arbitrations pursuant to the world Bank's International Centre for

Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) do have a more state affiliated basis. Unlike
arbitrations under the ICC or pursuant to ad hoc rules, the ICSID Convention entitles Member

states to select four panel arbitrators who may be called upon by the ICSID to arbitrate disputes.
However, parties arbitrating under the ICSID need not choose from these member State panelists
and may elect arbitrators without the ICSID choosing from the panel. See Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,

[1966] 17 U.S.T. 1291, T.1.A.S. No. 6090, art. 12-16 [hereinafter "ICSID Convention"].
230. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2020); Hanwei Guo
v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2020). See also Alejandro A. Nava
Cuenca, Debunking the Myths: InternationalCommercial Arbitration and Section 1782(a), 46
YALE J. INT'L L. 155, 183 (2021).
231. New York Arbitration Convention, Contracting States - List of Contracting States,
https://www.newyorkconvention.org/list+of+contracting+states [https://perma.cc/7XUS-SNB6]

(last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
232. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral

Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
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disputes versus for domestic, and (2) burdening the otherwise efficient
arbitral process.
1. Asymmetrical Effects: Judicial Discovery Aid in Domestic
Arbitration vs Foreign Arbitration
This concern arises from the parallel application of the FAA
governing information gathering in domestic arbitration and § 1782
providing additional aid for use in foreign arbitrations. These concerns
have been addressed by cases on both sides of the dispute. Both the
Fourth Circuit's Servotronics II opinion and the Sixth Circuit's ALJ
Transportation opinion acknowledged these legitimate policy concerns
but determined that the discretion vested in the court to deny these
applications and to limit the scope of the discovery could remedy these
concerns. 233 By contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits credited these
concerns as inconsistent with Congressional intent.2 3 4
Intel's holding focused on judicial discretion in granting these
requests. There, the Supreme Court declined to impose a categorical bar
on certain classes of cases under § 1782 to account for policy concerns. 2 35
This reading to avoid adding extra-statutory requirements makes sense
given the possibility of avoiding these potential issues through the
exercise of judicial discretion. Even the Intel factors themselves contain
guidance that could minimize the negative impacts stemming from this
broad judicial grant of power to foreign arbitration. 236
2. Burdening Efficient Arbitration Proceedings
The loss of efficiencies from applying § 1782 to private arbitral
proceedings has also been addressed on both sides of the dispute.
Biedermann and NationalBroadcastingfirst expressed fears of U.S. style
discovery overtaking the limited information gathering permitted under

233. Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 2020); Abdul Latif
Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., 939 F.3d 710, 728 (6th Cir. 2019).

234. Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999); Servotronics,
Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2020).
235. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 261-62 (2004).
236. See Kenneth Beale, Justin Lugar, and Franz Schwarz, Solving the § 1782 Puzzle:
BringingCertainty to the Debate of 28 U.S.C. § 1782's Application to InternationalArbitration,
47 STAN. J INT'L L. 51, 96-106 (2011) (describing a normative approach to § 1782 guiding judicial
discretion in granting these applications). By looking to the application of the Intel factors
specifically towards the arbitral panel, judicial precedent supporting arbitral proceedings and the
actual content of the parties' arbitration agreements, judicial discretion can allay the worst of the
effects resulting from the asymmetrical application of the information gathering procedures for
use in arbitration. Id.
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traditional arbitration. 237 However, international arbitrations are not
always pursued simply because of the efficiencies gained from simplified
proceedings. Rather, concerns about judicial enforceability ofjudgments
issued in international conflicts and the need for a neutral forum often
23 8
underlie the choice to arbitrate private international disputes.
Further, even if efficiency were foremost on the parties' minds in
arbitrating these disputes, the parties' agreement to arbitrate can
adequately protect this interest. Parties may contract to limit the scope of
2 39
discovery and to ensure the arbitration is conducted efficiently.
CONCLUSION

Just as in the pre-Intel era, a fundamental difference of interpretation
has divided the courts in their definition of a tribunal under § 1782. This
difference can and has caused inconvenience for practitioners who may
apply for aid for use in the same foreign proceeding and receive different
answers depending on where the information sought is found. Though the
analyses and arguments have remained relatively consistent throughout
cases, the vastly different conclusions underscore the need for judicial
review and clarity on this issue. Though it is uncertain whether the Court
will grant review of this issue, the Court's decision will likely be guided
by Intel as well as the circuit interpretations of the statute. The precedent
set by Intel, the application of a functional test for quasi-judicial tribunals,
the plain text as well as legislative history all support an expansive
reading of § 1782(a) that should encompass private arbitral panels.

237. El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App'x
31, 34 (5th Cir. 2009); National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184,
190-91 (2d Cir. 1999); Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999).
238. See Nava Cuenca, supra note 230, 170-71; Jennifer Sandlin, Practicalities and
CommercialRealities: § 1782 and Its Application to Private CommercialArbitration, 44 J. LEGAL
PROF. 223, 239 (2020).
239. Sandlin, supra note 238, at 240.
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